CRE Pulse — Providence-Warwick, RI-MA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · RI, MA
The read
$0.3B of CMBS across 37 loans. Retail is the largest book ($0.2B, 0.0% high-risk). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027 ($0.1B). Realized distress is easing at 0.0%. 6 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Banks & Operators
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The most-stressed CMBS properties, recent store closures and layoffs in this market — pinned to address where we have it (ZIP-level otherwise). Open any dot to the loan behind it →
CMBS High-Risk UPB
$0.0B / 0.0%
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$0.1B
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 12
Bank Early-Warning
4 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
6
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
37 / $0B
Unemployment · May 2026
3.8%
-0.6pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
118,625
-1.6% yr
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · May 2026
3.8%
-0.6pp yr
Last 24 months
3.8%5.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 617,760 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS high-risk rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
0 of 2 property types here run a higher high-risk rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the high-risk sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $0.2B of the metro's $0.3B; each bar's colored share is its high-risk rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, high-risk within eachSee what’s maturing →
$0.1B — 29% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already high-risk.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FALLING — 0.0% now (2026-07), -6.3pp over the year.
Two different lenses, so the numbers differ on purpose: high-risk (the cards above) is our forward stress score — the share flagged HIGH/CRITICAL. Realized distress here is what’s already delinquent, in special servicing, or below 1.0× DSCR (from the disclosed history panel, so coverage varies).
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing, 60+ days delinquent, or sub-1.0 DSCR, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Centreville Bank | $1.3B | 304% | 3.80% | 🔒 |
| Citizens Bank, National Association | $27.6B | 103% | 2.39% | 🔒 |
| Shoreham Bank | $140M | 255% | 1.89% | 🔒 |
| Baycoast Bank | $1.2B | 478% | 1.68% | 🔒 |
| Bristol County Savings Bank | $1.2B | 252% | 1.14% | 🔒 |
| Fall River Five Cents Savings Bank | $590M | 437% | 0.49% | 🔒 |
| North Easton Savings Bank | $473M | 281% | 0.17% | 🔒 |
| Banknewport | $1.1B | 379% | 0.14% | 🔒 |
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
6 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and CRE bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-06-23
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-04-28
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-03-24
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-01-22
CLOSURE
Providence
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Warwick
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
North Attleboro
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
North Dartmouth
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Raynham
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Seekonk
2025-06-26
CLOSURE
Fall River
2025-04-30
CLOSURE
Fairhaven
2025-03-17
CLOSURE
Norton
2025-01-31
CLOSURE
Providence
2025-01-24
CLOSURE
Providence
2006-10-30
LAYOFF
Mansfield
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Market Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.